Switzerland is presented as a limited, cautionary example in the argument over confederate government. Its cantons possess few common institutions, and the ties that keep them together depend heavily on geography, shared circumstances, and specific provisions for cooperation. When religious disagreement becomes a severe test, those ties fail: the league effectively divides, and its religious associations form separate diets and foreign alliances.

A Confederacy with Few Common Institutions

The account first qualifies Switzerland’s status as a confederacy, arguing that the connection among its cantons scarcely merits the name. They share no common treasury, troops, coinage, or court, and lack other ordinary signs of a common sovereignty. The apparent stability of the arrangement therefore cannot, by itself, establish that a lightly organized union can reliably govern its members.

Instead, the cantons’ cohesion rests on circumstances particular to their situation. Their topographical position, individual weakness, and fear of powerful neighbors help hold them together. The account also points to the limited sources of contention among a people described as having simple and homogeneous manners, their shared interest in dependent possessions, and their need for mutual assistance in suppressing insurrections and rebellions. These supports are contingent: they describe conditions that sustain cooperation, not a strong central authority capable of compelling it in every dispute.

Arbitration and the Limits of Enforcement

The Swiss arrangement does include a procedure for resolving disputes among cantons. Each side chooses four judges from neutral cantons; if those judges cannot agree, they select an umpire. The tribunal, sworn to impartiality, gives a final judgment that all the cantons are bound to enforce. This mechanism supplies a regular way to settle disagreements without relying solely on the parties’ competing claims.

Yet the account questions whether the obligation is sufficient when a party refuses to comply. A treaty made in 1683 with Victor Amadeus of Savoy required him to mediate disputes between the cantons and, if necessary, use force against a contumacious party. The need for this outside commitment serves as evidence that the union’s own arrangements may not be adequate to secure compliance. Switzerland’s arbitration system thus illustrates both the possibility of orderly dispute settlement and the weakness of a confederacy whose decisions may require external pressure to take effect.

Religious Division and Foreign Alliances

The decisive test comes when religious controversies ignite violent conflicts on three occasions. In the account’s interpretation, these contests effectively sever the league: the Protestant and Catholic cantons thereafter maintain separate diets, where they settle their most important affairs. The general diet is left with little more than the care of common bailages. A formal connection remains, but political deliberation has shifted into divided institutions.

The separation also changes the cantons’ external relationships. Berne leads the Protestant association, which allies with the United Provinces; Lucerne leads the Catholic association, which allies with France. Internal disagreement has therefore become a source of competing foreign alignments, further weakening the prospect of common action. The example’s significance lies not in proving that Switzerland has no means of cooperation, but in showing how narrow and circumstance-dependent those means may be when a major conflict divides the members.